Free Speech Arguments

• Free Speech Arguments - Can Maine’s State Legislature Deny Voting Rights to a Legislator for a Social Media Post? (Libby v. Fecteau)

  Episode 31: Libby v. FecteauLibby, et al. v. Fecteau, et al., argued before Circuit Judge Lara Montecalvo, Circuit Judge Seth Aframe, and District Judge Camille Vélez-Rivé in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on June 5, 2025. Argued by Taylor Meehan of Consovoy McCarthy PLLC (on behalf of Laurel Libby, et al.), Harmeet Dhillon, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights (for Amicus Curiae United States, supporting appellant), and Jonathan Bolton, Maine Assistant Attorney General (on behalf of Ryan M. Fecteau, et al.).Background of the case, from the Brief of Appellants:In February, Libby took to Facebook to call attention to Maine’s [transgender athlete] policy, borne out at this year’s high school track-and-field state championship. The championship was a public event; the names, schools, and podium photos of participants were widely broadcast and readily accessible online. Libby re-posted already-public, truthful information showing the first-place girls’ pole vaulter previously competed in boys’ pole vault. That first-place finish propelled the athlete’s high school team to win the girls’ state championship by one point.Libby’s post put Maine’s policy in the national spotlight, prompting federal investigations regarding Maine’s noncompliance with federal law. Days later, the Maine House censured Libby along a party-line vote of 75 to 70. The censure resolution called on Libby to “publicly apologize” for bringing “national attention” to Maine. H.R. Res. 1, 132nd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2025). It denounced Libby’s “statement criticizing the participation of transgender students in high school sports” as “reprehensible” and “incompatible with her duty and responsibilities as a Member of this House.” And while the resolution faulted Libby for identifying a “student athlete by [first] name” and “showing the minor in an athletic uniform” without “consent,” id., the post merely copied public information, showing podium photos from widely publicized state championship events, contained no threats, and violated no law. The resolution omitted that the Speaker and others regularly show minors on their social media, without any indication of consent from the subjects.Dissenting House members criticized the resolution as “a mockery of the censure process,” “set[ting] a standard … that the majority party, when they’re displeased with a social media post that upsets them, can censure a member of the minority party.” Other representatives raised free-speech concerns and sought clarification on whether members who re-posted Libby’s post could “expect censures to come forth on them as well.” The Speaker disclaimed knowledge of “any other censures.”After the censure resolution passed, the Speaker summoned Libby to the well of the House chamber and demanded she apologize. When Libby refused to recant her views, the Speaker found her in violation of Maine House Rule 401(11), providing that a member “guilty of a breach of any of the rules and orders of the House … may not be allowed to vote or speak … until the member has made satisfaction.”Ever since, Libby’s district has had no voice or vote on the House floor. The Speaker has stopped Libby from speaking on any bill, including even posing a question in a recent debate on an equal rights amendment proposed for the state constitution.Statement of the Issue, from Brief of Appellants:Whether Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction on their claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Guarantee Clause [of “a Republican Form of Government].”The Institute for Free Speech promotes and defends the political speech rights to freely speak, assemble, publish, and petition the government guaranteed by the First Amendment. If you’re enjoying the Free Speech Arguments podcast, please subscribe and leave a review on your preferred podcast platform. To support the Institute’s mission or inquire about legal assistance, please visit our website: www.ifs.org

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• Can Public Colleges Compel Faculty to Promote State-Mandated Political Ideology? (Johnson v. Watkin, et al.)

  Episode 31: Johnson v. Watkin, et al.Johnson v. Watkin, et al., argued before Circuit Judges Consuelo M. Callahan, Bridget S. Bade, and Lucy H. Koh in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on June 2, 2025. Argued by Alan Gura of the Institute for Free Speech (on behalf of Daymon Johnson) and Jay C. Russell, Deputy Attorney General of California (on behalf of Defendant-Appellee Sonya Christian, Chancellor of the California Community College System), and David A. Urban (on behalf of the Bakersfield College Defendants-Appellees).Background of the case, from the Appellant’s Brief:School officials have investigated history Professor Daymon Johnson for his private political speech and warned that they could investigate him again. Johnson heads the faculty’s dissident Renegade Institute for Liberty (“RIFL”) [named for the school’s “Renegade” mascot] because officials fired his immediate predecessor as RIFL Faculty Lead, Professor Matthew Garrett, for his protected First Amendment political speech. (RIFL takes its name after the school’s athletic teams.) Among Garrett’s speech offenses: writing newspaper editorials, giving media interviews about political topics, and, like the activity for which officials investigated Johnson, discussing politics on social media. Some of the Facebook posts for which officials punished Garrett were actually Johnson’s.Making matters worse, the Chancellor of California’s community college system now maintains a pervasive set of “competencies and criteria” enforcing an official political ideology—diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility (“DEIA”), which includes “anti-racism”—that faculty must incorporate into every facet of their professional and even personal life.…Fearing additional reprisals for his political speech, unable to continue participating on school committees that now require DEIA compliance, and unwilling to teach or otherwise kowtow to the state’s official political ideology—despite knowing that his performance evaluations and thus continued employment hinge on doing exactly that—Johnson sought relief securing his First Amendment rights. In an exhaustive, 107-paragraph declaration spanning 29 pages, Johnson detailed not only how the school investigated him for his political speech and terminated his colleague for speaking similarly, but also the speech he refrains from expressing and the speech he is compelled to make in violation of his conscience.The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation explaining why Johnson is entitled to a preliminary injunction on nearly all his claims. But Johnson’s preliminary injunction motion languished, remaining undecided for well over a year. When the district court finally turned to the motion (after Johnson petitioned for mandamus relief), it claimed that Johnson failed to plead highly specific details of his planned speech, which are either readily inferable, unnecessary, or, in some instances, set forth in Johnson’s declaration. The court also found that Johnson’s speech isn’t proscribed by the challenged provisions (that defendants invoked when punishing speech), and failed to acknowledge the threats to Johnson should he speak freely.Resources:Institute for Free Speech case page for Johnson v. Watkin, et al. (which includes all briefs)The Institute for Free Speech promotes and defends the political speech rights to freely speak, assemble, publish, and petition the government guaranteed by the First Amendment. If you’re enjoying the Free Speech Arguments podcast, please subscribe and leave a review on your preferred podcast platform. To support the Institute’s mission or inquire about legal assistance, please visit our website: www.ifs.org

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• Can Arizona Compel Broad Donor Disclosure for Ordinary Speech? (Americans for Prosperity, et al. v. Meyer, et al.)

  Episode 30: Americans for Prosperity, et al. v. Meyer, et al.Americans for Prosperity, et al. v. Meyer, et al., argued before Circuit Judges Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Patrick J. Bumatay, and Gabriel P. Sanchez in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on May 15, 2025. Argued by Derek L. Shaffer (on behalf of Americans for Prosperity, et al.) and David Kolker (on behalf of Intervenor-Defendant Voters’ Right to Know) and Eric Fraser (on behalf of Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Commission).Background of the case, from the Institute for Free Speech amicus brief:Proposition 211 imposes sweeping disclosure rules unlike anything seen before. On every metric, the law expands on its predecessors. It covers more people, more speech, for a longer time. Where other laws narrow, Proposition 211 widens.….Proposition 211 expands on other disclosure rules in virtually every way. It does not limit disclosure to speech about elections, to speech close in time to elections, or to speech by those engaged mainly in election advocacy. It does not limit disclosure to donors who intend to support election advocacy, or even donors who know their dollars might be used for election advocacy. By expanding every part of an ordinary disclosure rule, Proposition 211 “accomplishes a shift in kind, not merely degree.” See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 583 (2012) (“NFIB”) (Roberts, C.J., op.). And that shift in kind turns a series of individually problematic provisions into a cataclysmic First Amendment violation.Statement of the Issues, from the Appellants’ Opening Brief:Whether the district court erred in concluding that Proposition 211 is facially valid even though its disclosures are untethered to electoral activity, its burdens surpass the strength of the State’s asserted interest, and its requirements are not narrowly tailored to the problems it purports to solve.Whether the district court erred in concluding that Proposition 211 is valid as applied to Appellants, even though Appellants alleged a reasonable probability that disclosure of their donors’ names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals.Whether the district court erred in concluding that Proposition 211 does not compel association even though its disclosure requirements tie organizations and their donors to candidates and causes irrespective of their actual beliefs.Resources:CourtListener docket page for Americans for Prosperity, et al. v. Meyer, et al.Appellants’ Opening BriefDefendant-Appellees’ Answering BriefAnswering Brief of Appellee-Intervenor DefendantAppellants’ Reply BriefInstitute for Free Speech amicus briefThe Institute for Free Speech promotes and defends the political speech rights to freely speak, assemble, publish, and petition the government guaranteed by the First Amendment. If you’re enjoying the Free Speech Arguments podcast, please subscribe and leave a review on your preferred podcast platform. To support the Institute’s mission or inquire about legal assistance, please visit our website: www.ifs.org

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• Can States Prohibit Pro-Bono Litigation Services for Candidates? (Institute for Free Speech v. J.R. Johnson, et al.)

  Episode 29: Institute for Free Speech v. J.R. Johnson, et al. Institute for Free Speech v. J.R. Johnson, et al. argued before Chief Judge Jennifer Walker Elrod and Judges Kurt D. Engelhardt and Greg Gerard Guidry in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on April 28, 2025. Argued by Del Kolde (on behalf of the Institute for Free Speech) and Cory R. Liu (on behalf of J.R. Johnson, et al.). Case Background, from the Institute for Free Speech website: Texas law prohibits corporations—including nonprofits—from making “in-kind contributions” to candidates and political committees. The Texas Ethics Commission (TEC) recently interpreted this ban to extend to pro bono litigation services, even when such services aim to challenge the constitutionality of state laws. The Institute for Free Speech (IFS) filed a federal lawsuit against the TEC commissioners and executive director over this ban on pro bono legal services. This law stops organizations like IFS from advocating for the civil rights of Texas candidates and political committees in court. It imposes stiff civil and criminal penalties for violations. The lawsuit argues that the TEC’s interpretation of the Texas Elections Code violates IFS’ First Amendment rights to free speech and association. The TEC’s reading of the law prevents IFS from representing potential clients like Chris Woolsey, a city councilmember in Corsicana, and the Texas Anti-Communist League PAC, headed by Cary Cheshire, both of whom want to contest a state law that compels speech on political signs. Resources: Institute for Free Speech case page Institute for Free Speech press release Plaintiff-Appellant’s Opening Brief  Complaint  The Institute for Free Speech promotes and defends the political speech rights to freely speak, assemble, publish, and petition the government guaranteed by the First Amendment. If you’re enjoying the Free Speech Arguments podcast, please subscribe and leave a review on your preferred podcast platform. To support the Institute’s mission or inquire about legal assistance, please visit our website: www.ifs.org

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• Can the White House Ban Outlets from the Press Pool? (Associated Press v. Taylor Budowich)

  Episode 28: Associated Press v. Taylor Budowich Associated Press v. Taylor Budowich, argued before a three-judge panel in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit on April 17, 2025. Argued by Eric D. McArthur (on behalf of Appellants Taylor Budowich, et al.) and Charles D. Tobin (on behalf of Appellee Associated Press). Lawyers for the Trump administration are seeking a stay on the DC District Court’s preliminary injunction rescinding “the denial of the AP’s access to the Oval Office, Air Force One, and other limited spaces based on the AP’s viewpoint.” Case Background, from the Memorandum and Order of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia: About two months ago, President Donald Trump renamed the Gulf of Mexico the Gulf of America. The Associated Press did not follow suit. For that editorial choice, the White House sharply curtailed the AP’s access to coveted, tightly controlled media events with the President. The AP now sues the White House chief of staff, her communications deputy, and the press secretary (collectively, “the Government”), seeking a preliminary injunction enjoining the Government from excluding it because of its viewpoint.  Today, the Court grants that relief. But this injunction does not limit the various permissible reasons the Government may have for excluding journalists from limited-access events. It does not mandate that all eligible journalists, or indeed any journalists at all, be given access to the President or nonpublic government spaces. It does not prohibit government officials from freely choosing which journalists to sit down with for interviews or which ones’ questions they answer. And it certainly does not prevent senior officials from publicly expressing their own views. No, the Court simply holds that under the First Amendment, if the Government opens its doors to some journalists—be it to the Oval Office, the East Room, or elsewhere—it cannot then shut those doors to other journalists because of their viewpoints. The Constitution requires no less. Resources: District Court Memorandum and OrderCourt Listener Docket The Institute for Free Speech promotes and defends the political speech rights to freely speak, assemble, publish, and petition the government guaranteed by the First Amendment. If you’re enjoying the Free Speech Arguments podcast, please subscribe and leave a review on your preferred podcast platform. To support the Institute’s mission or inquire about legal assistance, please visit our website: www.ifs.org

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