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  • Ancient Arts, Modern Ethics, and the New Battlefield
    The recent Defence Committee report, Defence in the Grey Zone, brings renewed focus to the challenge of hostile activity below the threshold of conventional war. The term 'Grey Zone' suggests a novel ambiguity, a modern strategic dilemma born of new technologies; this ambiguous environment challenges not only our strategic doctrines but also our classical ethical frameworks for conflict. However, while the character of this struggle is undeniably new, its foundational principles are not. The Grey Zone is the modern evolution of ancient principles of statecraft, supercharged by technology and the unique vulnerabilities of a hyperconnected world. To navigate this strategic evolution requires both re-understanding the classical strategists, from Sun Tzu and Kautilya to Clausewitz and Liddell Hart, while simultaneously grappling with profound ethical questions they could never have envisioned. The Timeless Why The strategic intent underpinning Grey Zone activity, to "coerce governments or simply erode their ability to function", is as old as statecraft itself. It is the practical application of "the acme of skill" according to Sun Tzu's Art of War: "to subdue the enemy without fighting". This ideal, which finds echoes in the "silent war" of Kautilya's Arthashastra, offers an intellectual foundation for modern Grey Zone Operations. From a Consequentialist perspective - where morality is based on outcomes alone - this is a grim yet vital calculus aimed at avoiding the greater evil of devastating state-on-state conflict. The report is replete with modern manifestations of ancient approaches. The use of propaganda and disinformation, "driving a wedge between social groups", is a direct heir to the classical strategy of attacking an adversary's societal cohesion. Sun Tzu notes that "all warfare is based on deception", while Kautilya takes this further, highlighting Bheda (sowing dissent) as one of the four primary tools of statecraft. The employment of "proxies, including sub-state actors such as rebel groups, mercenaries, criminal gangs, or cyber 'hacktivists'", offers the same plausible deniability sought by ancient spymasters. Sun Tzu dedicates an entire chapter to the use of spies for gaining intelligence and manipulating the enemy, while Kautilya describes vast and intricate spy networks as the primary tool for both internal control and external influence. The report's observation that "attribution of grey zone activity is often challenging" is equally neither a new nor unforeseen problem but the intended outcome of a strategy designed to achieve political effect while adhering to the Jus Ad Bellum ('justice to war', the principles governing righteous initiation of war) principle of Right Intention (from the aggressor's perspective at least) by avoiding an overt act of war. The goal, now as then, is to weaken the adversary from within, making them politically, economically, and socially unable to resist. The Transformative What While the strategic why is timeless, the what - the nature of modern warfare and in particular that of the Grey Zone challenge - has fundamentally transformed. Technology has not merely supplied new tools for the strategist's arsenal, but created entirely new domains of conflict and systemic vulnerabilities that are without historical precedent. The report correctly states that "technology has magnified the impact and global reach of grey zone attacks, and identified new areas for prosecuting operations that did not exist a generation ago, particularly regarding cyberattacks". This has created a geographically boundless cyber domain where adversaries may conduct countless operations on a scale, and at a rate, previously unimaginable - such as the "over 90,000 sub-threshold attacks" launched against the MoD's networks over just two years. This digital dependency has birthed a new critical national vulnerability: the physical infrastructure of the internet. The report highlights the "approximately 60 under...
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  • Integrated strategy and Human Security outcomes: The British Army's engineering surveys in Albania
    Aligned to His Majesty's Government (HMG) priorities of curtailing irregular migration and associated connections to human trafficking from Albania, efforts to address the drivers of migration and organised crime at source are underway. The British Army's ongoing specialist survey work in Albania's Kukës Subterranean Complex (KSC) may lead to livelihood creation, mitigating some of the risk factors of human trafficking. This demonstrates the military instrument's contribution to Human Security. UK Strategy on Irregular Migration from Albania Enabled in large part by online messaging applications such as TikTok Albanians made up a quarter of all arrivals to the UK by small boats at a reported peak in 2022. The UK's Home Affairs Committee June 2023 report details the legal, social and political context of migration to the UK from Albania. Three key drivers identified are: 1. Economic migration because of Albania's comparative poverty 2. Refugees (particularly women) who have been trafficked or made modern slaves; and 3. Organised crime In 2023 and 2024, the UK returned more Albanians (2624) by nationality than any other, but irregular detections from Albania continued throughout 2024 (825). Time should be taken to understand migration terms and figures (see here), but the key takeaway is that the UK's intent is to reduce migration and where possible, minimise push factors at source To achieve this effect, cross-government strategy in partnership with international state and non-state partners has been pursued, complimented by a plethora of UK-Albania bilaterals, culminating in a Bilateral Cooperation Plan signed in December 2022 which centred around 'security and home affairs' with a focus on 'organised crime and illegal immigration'. Development of Kukës city - a vulnerable area prone to criminality and trafficking 'from which a substantial proportion of Albanian emigration to the UK occurs' - has been recognised as means to combat emigration. The UK has already worked with local NGOs, UNICEF and conducted fact finding missions in Kukës on perceptions and drivers of emigration. Defence Integrating into UK Strategy On 17 July 2023, the then Secretary for Defence Ben Wallace received Albanian Defence Minister Niko Peleshi in London, with former Minister of State Baroness Goldie later signing a Statement of Intent (SoI) between the two MoDs with Peleshi. The SoI is wide ranging, and leaves plenty of scope for 'any new potential areas of cooperation'. Likely by design, the SoI does not detail expected outcomes, but does list some specific outputs, one of which includes 'infrastructural development'. While the military instrument is not positioned as the lead actor in counter-trafficking efforts, those drafting the SoI seem aware that military activity could contribute meaningfully to the conditions which reduce trafficking risk. The Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) form completed for bilateral activity reinforces this interpretation. The military engagement is framed in terms of defence engagement, recognising 'representatives of other [Albanian] government and academic institutions also attend activity delivered by the UK Defence Section in support of UK Partners Across Government'. The effect is subtle but significant: rather than overstate Defence's role, the SoI and OSJA position military activity as a potential discreet net contributor to broader foreign policy and Human Security outcomes - reduction of emigration and associated trafficking through targeted development programmes at source. In this context, the absence of outcome language should be read not as an oversight, but as policy discipline. It reflects a conscious decision to align with HMG objectives without mischaracterising the military's role or inadvertently committing Defence to outcomes it alone cannot deliver. The Plan 'Exploring the potentials of the tunnels' was agreed as an output in the Defence and Security Bilateral Cooperation planned o...
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  • Identification/Mission First in the Digital Age
    This brief presents a strategic imperative. The development of the IMF is consistently bound by a very complex set of messaging - not just within the MoD but also across its supplier base - whereby interlinking technology, organisational and institutional change is hindering scalability across 'The Stack'. Increasingly, the three components of technology, people, and change need to be brought together using simple themes of design, build, secure and deliver to create the required capability positioning both within the MoD and its acquisition processes. This will demand a unifying plan/approach by the MoD to manage and exploit fully the IMF approach - consolidating a range of individual components such as cloud, security, et, under a cohesive plan/framework to support operational outcomes.[/note] to embed an Identification/Mission First (IMF) framework at the core of UK Defence. In the face of rising digital threats and rapid technological evolution, the UK must shift from legacy force structures to an agile, information-led defence model where identification, not just firepower, drives operational advantage. IMF is defined as the ability to collect, process, and exploit information faster and more effectively than adversaries, seamlessly connecting Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), Logistics (including Medical), Command and Control (C2), and FIRES. This is both a technological and behavioural shift, aligning with modern warfare doctrines such as UK Fusion Doctrine, NATO's Comprehensive Approach and the Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act (OODA) loop.1 In an increasingly congested, contested, and connected battlespace, information superiority - not platform superiority - is the decisive edge, with speed of identification and mission alignment emerging as critical differentiators. As such, data must be treated as a strategic asset, akin to oil in the 20th century, requiring ethical prioritisation, protection, and operationalisation. Furthermore, civilian digital infrastructure, including social media and undersea cables, forms a crucial part of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) ecosystem, and must be lawfully integrated into defence strategies.2 To operationalise these imperatives, several core recommendations are identified and proposed. Under Leadership and Governance, Defence should appoint a Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) for Identification/Mission First (IMF) and establish a Digital Identification Task Force under Military Strategic Headquarters (MSHQ) to oversee strategy, ethics, and innovation. In terms of Workforce and Skills, it is essential to build a pipeline of data-literate, ethics-conscious strategists, and to incentivise digital fluency across all services through tailored career pathways. Regarding Investment and Architecture, Defence must prioritise sovereign, interoperable digital systems with low latency and secure data exchange, while embedding real-time, multi-domain identification layers into command, control (C2), and ISR platforms. For Operational Integration, IMF capabilities should be embedded into Joint Action doctrine and field exercises, and open-source intelligence should be harnessed through structured, policy-governed approaches. Finally, under Strategic Communication and Ethics, a Defence-wide Digital Ethics and Law Compliance Framework must be established, alongside clearly defined red lines for the use of private and civilian digital systems in targeting and surveillance. These measures collectively aim to ensure that Defence maintains its competitive edge through agile, ethical, and integrated information dominance Introduction Digital connectivity and rapid technological change have redefined modern warfare, where information superiority increasingly determines success. While kinetic force retains importance, digital tempo - the speed and effectiveness of information-action cycles - has become decisive.3 The MoD remains constrained by legacy structures ...
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  • NATO's Early Cold War Lessons Show What US, Japan, and South Korea Must Do Now
    In the not-so-distant future, a U.S. military commander in the Indo-Pacific could be forced to fight two major wars at once - one against a Chinese assault on Taiwan, the other against a North Korean attack on the Korean Peninsula. This dual-front crisis scenario, long considered unlikely, is now routinely modeled in wargames and quietly debated in high-level policy circles. Yet the United States and its East Asian allies remain unprepared - not in terms of firepower, but in coordination, planning, and execution. Today's alliance architecture is not designed to handle a simultaneous conflict in Taiwan and Korea. The existing command structures are fragmented, force designs are nationally siloed, and procurement choices are often politically misaligned. In short, there is no unified playbook for fighting two wars in East Asia - let alone winning them. But the United States has faced a similar problem before. From NATO's founding in 1949 through West Germany's integration in 1955, Washington confronted a world where it had to deter simultaneous threats in Europe and Asia. It responded by building institutions - not just capabilities. The first phase of NATO's evolution offers enduring lessons in how to organize allies, align procurement, and prepare for multi-theater war. Today, the U.S.-Japan-South Korea triangle urgently needs to draw from that experience before the next crisis begins. Learning from NATO's Blueprint At the 1952 Lisbon Conference, NATO members committed to fielding 50 divisions - an ambitious goal that drove significant increases in defense spending across Europe. Washington played a central role in catalyzing this shift through economic leverage, strategic vision, and the shared threat of Soviet aggression. But what mattered more than raw spending was the coordinated structure that emerged: NATO didn't just build forces; it built a cohesive force. A parallel dynamic is unfolding in East Asia. Japan has pledged to double its defense budget by 2027, investing heavily in standoff missiles, ISR, and munition stockpiles. South Korea already spends over 2.7% of GDP on defense and is expanding long-range strike capabilities, naval power, and missile defenses. But unlike the early NATO experience, these efforts remain nationally fragmented. Without integration, the investments of today may become the inefficiencies of tomorrow. NATO's lesson is clear: deterrence is not created by defense spending alone. It depends on force structure coherence, shared priorities, and a division of labor among allies. If Japan fields Tomahawk cruise missiles and South Korea invests in submarine-launched cruise missiles and explores the development of a light aircraft carrier, who integrates and sustains these systems when crises erupt? Which ally reinforces which theater, and how quickly? Without institutional answers to these questions, military planning becomes guesswork. The lack of a trilateral command mechanism is one of the most pressing gaps. In 1951, NATO established SHAPE - the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe - as a centralized node for operational planning, logistics, and interoperability. Nothing like SHAPE exists in the Indo-Pacific today. The U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command and U.S.-Japan coordination under USFJ and INDOPACOM remain bilateral and compartmentalized. The result is a strategic blind spot. In a Taiwan conflict, U.S. naval assets might be redeployed from Korean waters. Simultaneously, while Japan's 2015 security legislation enables expanded support for U.S. operations, political and legal constraints could still delay or limit Japan's full-spectrum support in a Korean contingency - particularly absent a trilateral planning framework. Rather than creating an "Asian NATO," the immediate solution could be the establishment of a trilateral planning cell within INDOPACOM - drawing staff from South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff and Japan's Self-Defense Forces. With access to real-time intelligence and s...
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  • Integrated Recce: Enhancing Cavalry Operations through technology on the CV90 Platform
    The rapid advancement of military technology continues to transform the operational landscape of modern warfare. Cavalry operations (CavOps), traditionally focused on reconnaissance and rapid manoeuvre, now increasingly rely on sophisticated sensor systems and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to maintain battlefield superiority. This article explores the integration of the Observation Targeting and Surveillance Systems (OTAS) and drone swarms controlled from the CV90 infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), coupled with the Digital Aided Fire Solution (DAFS). Focusing on the Norwegian Army's implementation efforts, it evaluates how this technological fusion enhances targeting capabilities and situational awareness whilst critically examining the cost-effectiveness and tactical trade-offs associated with tethered drone systems. Cavalry Formations and Their Operational Concepts: The Case of Porsanger Battalion A cavalry formation primarily conducts its missions as part of enabling operations (US ARMY, 2016, p. 12) . Enabling operations are operations that facilitate a transition to either offensive or defensive operations (NATO Standardization Agency, 2009, p. 185) . Within this spectrum, a cavalry formation must be capable of conducting reconnaissance and security operations. Therefore, it is important to combine firepower, manoeuvre, and protection with the ability to identify targets. Porsanger Battalion, within the framework of the Finnmark Brigade, is Norway's only pure cavalry formation dimensioned for this role. Norway has chosen to use the CV90 platform for the concept development of such a cavalry formation. Similar to several Nordic countries, more are now recognising the platform's utility in terms of adaptability and flexibility, acquiring the CV90 platform for their own armed forces (Ministry of Defence, 2025) The CV90 Platform and OTAS Capabilities The CV90 Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), developed by BAE Systems Hägglunds and fielded by several NATO countries, is a modular, highly adaptable platform tailored for reconnaissance and combat operations in demanding environments. Its open digital architecture enables integration of advanced mission systems, transforming the vehicle into a networked sensor and command node. A key capability enhancer is the Observation Targeting and Surveillance Systems (OTAS), which significantly improves the CV90's effectiveness in surveillance, target acquisition, and precision engagement. In the Norwegian CV90 reconnaissance configuration, OTAS incorporates the Chess Dynamics Hawkeye Modular Mission Pod (MMP); a mast-mounted, multi-sensor suite combining electro-optical and infrared sensors, a high-power daylight camera, a long-range laser rangefinder (>30 km), a laser pointer, and a compact radar system for target detection and tracking. This radar capability provides persistent surveillance and allows for wide-area situational awareness, even in degraded visual environments. The system meets Category 1 Target Location Error (TLE) standards, the highest level of geolocation accuracy in NATO, enabling precise engagement at ranges beyond 20 km. Integrated into either a local Combat Management System (CMS) or a broader Battlefield Information System (BIS), and enhanced by AI-powered classification and tracking tools, OTAS delivers near-real-time threat detection and dissemination across the network. This dramatically increases the unit's operational autonomy and survivability in fast-paced, sensor-dense battlespaces (Chess Dynamics, 2023) . Drone Swarms and Digital Fire Solutions Integration Integrating drone swarms directly into the CV90's command ecosystem represents a fundamental shift in how reconnaissance and targeting operations are conducted. Unlike conventional UAV operations that depend on external ground control stations, deploying and controlling drone swarms from within the vehicle reduces communication latency and enhances tactical responsiveness (Edvardsen & Hansen, 2024)...
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