Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

• Zevachim 51 - November 4, 13 Cheshvan

  Study Guide After suggesting that one can learn from Rabbi Meir's opinion about melika of a bird that is a treifa, that one can learn a binyan av from a kal va'chomer in kodashim, sacrificial items, the Gemara rejects this explanation because it is derived from chulin, not kodashim. Can one derive a law through a binyan av and then use another method of hermeneutics to derive something else? The Gemara only suggests an answer for a binyan av on a binyan av, but that answer is rejected since the method of derivation in the braita does not make sense. It must be derived from a verse in the Torah, Vayikra 2:6, and the braita is just being used as an asmachta. The remainder of the blood of the inner offerings is poured on the base of the altar on the western side. This is derived from Vayikra 4:7 where it states, "opposite the entrance to Ohel Moed," which refers to the exit of the sanctuary, which is by the western side of the altar. In Vayikra chapter 4, the phrase "pour on the base of the altar" is mentioned for three different sacrifices. Each one teaches a different law relating either to the base of the altar or to the pouring of the remainder. The Gemara explains why these verses were available to be extrapolated and were not necessary for their straightforward meaning.

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• Zevachim 50 - November 3, 12 Cheshvan

  Study Guide The Gemara explores various hermeneutical methods used to derive halakhic laws - juxtaposition (hekesh), gezeira shava (verbal analogy), kal va'chomer (a fortiori reasoning), and binyan av (paradigm from precedent). It raises the question: can a law derived through one method serve as the basis for further derivation, either by the same method or a different one? They systematically examine each possible permutation, presenting logical arguments and textual proofs to evaluate the validity and limitations of such compound derivations. Importantly, this entire discussion is confined to laws pertaining to sacrificial items (kodashim) alone.

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• Zevachim 49 - November 2, 11 Cheshvan

  From where do we derive that the law regarding slaughtering of the burnt offering must be in the North, and that if not, it is disqualified? Since the sin offering is invalid if not slaughtered and its blood received in the North, and this requirement is derived from the burnt offering, a logical argument is made that the same requirement must apply to the burnt offering itself: how can a secondary prohibition be more strict than the primary prohibition? Three halakhot are brought to challenge this logic, but all difficulties are resolved. The Gemara then presents a second derivation for the requirement of the North for a burnt offering, based on the repetition of this requirement in Vayikra 4:29, following its initial mention in verse 24. The guilt offering must also be slaughtered and its blood collected in the North, and if not, it is disqualified. This is derived from two verses: Vayikra 7:2 and 14:13. A difficulty is raised regarding the use of the second verse, which relates to the sacrifices brought by the leper during the purification process, as that verse is needed for a different drasha. However, this challenge is resolved. The verse concerning the leper's sacrifices juxtaposes the guilt offering with both the burnt offering and the sin offering. If the law of the North for a guilt offering is derived from the burnt offering, why is the sin offering mentioned in that verse as well? Ravina explains that its inclusion teaches the principle that a law derived through juxtaposition cannot be used to teach that same law in another case through juxtaposition. Rava derives this principle from a different source: the bull sin offering of the kohen gadol, Vayikra 4:9–10. Can a law derived by juxtaposition be used to teach something through a gezeira shava? Initially, a proof is brought from the law regarding leprous clothing, which is derived from the law concerning a person with leprosy—originally derived through a gezeira shava. Rabbi Yochanan rejects this proof, arguing that the rules for deriving laws related to sacrificial items differ from those governing other laws. This distinction is demonstrated by the requirement of the North in the case of a guilt offering, which could have been derived from a gezeira shava from the sin offering, but was not - precisely for this reason.  

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• Zevachim 48 - Shabbat November 1, 10 Cheshvan

  Why does the Mishna begin with the bull offering of Yom Kippur as its first example? Given that the primary halakha regarding slaughtering in the northern part of the Azara (Temple courtyard) is derived from the burnt offering, one might expect that to be the opening case. Why would the inner sin offerings appear before regular sin offerings? The verse that establishes the requirement of slaughtering in the North appears in the context of the sheep burnt offering. From this, the rabbis extrapolate the same requirement for burnt offerings brought from cattle. This derivation hinges on the presence of a connecting vav ("and") in the verse about sheep, which links it to the preceding section discussing cattle. The vav serves as a bridge, allowing the laws of the later section to inform those of the earlier one. However, the Gemara challenges this method of derivation, questioning how it can be valid for those who reject such connections and brings a braita to prove that there is a debate regarding this issue. The debate is about whether one brings a hanging guilt offering if one is in doubt that one committed mei'la, misuse of consecrated property. After initially suggesting that the disagreement was about whether one can derive laws of one section from another if they are connected by a vav, this explanation is rejected, and three alternative interpretations are proposed. Of these, only the final one is accepted. The sin offering, like the burnt offering, must be slaughtered in the North of the Azara. This is derived from Vayikra 4:29, which states that the sin offering is slaughtered "in the place of the burnt offering." Additional verses establish that not only must the blood be received in the North, but the priest receiving it must also be standing in the North. These requirements are shown to be essential and not merely ideal. In Vayikra 4:24, the verse says, "And he shall slaughter it in the North." The Gemara analyzes the word "it" to determine what it might exclude. Four possibilities are considered, and after rejecting three, the Gemara concludes that the correct interpretation is that the animal itself must be in the North, but the person performing the slaughter need not be. Since the sin offering is invalid if not slaughtered and its blood received in the North—and this requirement is derived from the burnt offering—a logical argument is made that the same strict requirement applies to the burnt offering itself.

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• Zevachim 47 - October 31, 9 Cheshvan

  A sin offering that is slaughtered for the sake of a non-sacred animal, the sacrifice is valid. However, if the owner slaughtered it thinking that the animal was not sacred, it is disqualified. The second category is called mitasek, one who did not at all intend to do the act. The source for this disqualification is brought from two verses, as two are necessary to prove that the intention for the act of slaughtering a sacrifice is an essential component. The Gemara explains that both tanna kama in the Mishna and Rabbi Yosi hold that the intention that is necessary, and can disqualify, is that of the kohen performing the sacrificial rites (or non-kohen who slaughtered). However, Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Yosi holds that the owner's intention can disqualify a sacrifice. Abaye brings two others who seem to have a similar opinion to Rabbi Elazar regarding other areas of halakha. Each case involves an instance where one person is performing an action on someone else's item, and the owner's intent can determine the status of the item. One case deals with slaughtering for idol worship, and the other is whether or not an item is considered significant enough to be liable for carrying on Shabbat. The fifth perek specifies details relating to all the sacrifices, including the location of the slaughtering and acceptance of the blood, where the blood is placed, etc. It begins with kodshei kodashim, a higher level of sanctity. The slaughtering of these sacrifices must take place on the northern side of the Azara. Before the Mishna details each of the offerings, it begins with a general statement about all kodshei kodashim and says their slaughtering is performed in the North. Why didn't it also mention another issue that is true for all of them - that their blood is collected in a sacred vessel? The Gemara explains that at first, they thought the blood of the leper could be collected in the kohen's hand, but they then realized that his hand can be used only for the blood going on the leper's ear, finger, and toe. The blood that is placed on the altar must first be placed in a sacred vessel. Since they originally thought otherwise, and two kohanim accept blood, each in a different manner, this is omitted from the opening line of the Mishna.

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