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VoxTalks Economics

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  • VoxTalks Economics

    S9 Ep30: Redefining the monetary standard

    22-05-2026 | 26 Min.
    The fiat money system has survived the Great Inflation, the global financial crisis, and a pandemic. But can it survive digital currencies?
    Bitcoin and the blockchain solved a genuine problem in computer science: how to stop people spending the same money twice. Forty years of successful inflation control means central bank money is stable; that is the stability in stablecoins, attempting to solve the volatility problem. What's next? What if the unit of account itself were indexed to consumer prices? Digitalisation might finally make that approach viable at scale. Price stability, by design.
    Will we still need cash? Maybe not now, But if you never use it, it may not be there if the blackout comes.
    The research behind this episode:
    Stracca, Livio. 2025. Redefining the Monetary Standard in the Digital Age: Digital Innovations and the Future of Monetary Policy. Springer Nature.
    To cite this episode:
    Phillips, Tim, and Livio Stracca. 2026. "Redefining the monetary standard." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). 

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    About the guest

    Livio Stracca is Deputy Director General for International and European Relations at the European Central Bank, where he has worked for more than two decades. His research spans monetary economics, international finance, and the implications of digitalisation for central banking, with extensive work on exchange rates, capital flows, and the architecture of the international monetary system. 
    Research cited in this episode

    The double-spend problem. The fundamental challenge in any decentralised digital payment system: how to prevent a participant from spending the same unit of money twice when there is no trusted central authority to verify transactions. Bitcoin's 2008 white paper offered an innovative solution by making the transaction ledger public, cumulative, and computationally expensive to rewrite. The trade-off is that transparency sacrifices privacy; every transaction is visible to all participants in the network.
    The blockchain. A distributed ledger in which transactions are grouped into sequential blocks, each cryptographically linked to the one before. Reversing any transaction requires rewriting every subsequent block, which demands enormous computational effort. This design solves the double-spend problem in a decentralised network but makes the system slow and costly to operate at scale.
    The payment trilemma. A framework discussed in the episode and in Stracca's book: any digital payment system can optimise for at most two of three properties simultaneously (universal access, security against fraudulent transactions, and privacy). Cash is the only instrument that escapes the trilemma; digital systems must accept a trade-off among the three, and the choice is often made implicitly by the designer of the system rather than through democratic deliberation.
    Hayek, Friedrich A. 1976. Denationalisation of Money. London: Institute of Economic Affairs. The classic argument for currency competition: let currencies compete freely and the one providing the most stable prices will win. Economists, including Milton Friedman, largely rejected the proposal on the grounds that money exhibits strong network externalities; the more people use a currency, the more attractive it becomes to the next user, producing a natural tendency towards monopoly. A formal modern revisitation, finding similar conclusions, is Fernández-Villaverde, Jesús, and Daniel Sanches. 2019. "Can Currency Competition Work?" Journal of Political Economy 127 (3): 1017 to 1058.
    Irving Fisher's compensated dollar. A proposal published in Fisher, Irving. 1913. "A Compensated Dollar." Quarterly Journal of Economics 27 (2): 213–235 (the same year the Federal Reserve was created). Fisher argued for a dollar whose purchasing power was held constant by adjusting its gold content in line with prices. The mechanical details of his proposal are no longer relevant, but its animating idea (indexing the unit of account to a price level) has gained new plausibility in a digital context.
    The Unidad de Fomento. Chile's inflation-indexed unit of account, in operation since 1967 and updated daily against the consumer price index. It is used widely in long-term contracts, including mortgages, and functions as a security that can be traded. Stracca cites it as evidence that an indexed monetary standard is operationally feasible, and as a prototype for what a digital equivalent might look like at larger scale.
    The Great Moderation. The period of low and stable inflation in advanced economies running roughly from the mid-1980s until the inflation episode of 2021 to 2023. Economists attribute it to improved monetary policy frameworks, particularly central bank independence, inflation targeting, and (crucially, in Stracca's account) the introduction of interest on reserves, which gave central banks precise control over the short-term interest rate without draining liquidity. Stracca treats the Great Moderation as the benchmark against which any proposed reform of the monetary standard must be judged.
    Programmable money. A form of digital money in which payment is conditional on an independently verifiable event, potentially confirmed by a machine rather than a human intermediary. Example: a payment that executes automatically when a delivery is confirmed by a sensor. Decentralised ledgers make such conditional payments technically straightforward; traditional banking systems can approximate them but with far greater friction. Stracca notes significant enthusiasm for programmable money but also real scepticism about whether the benefits outweigh the complexity in practice.
    More VoxTalks Economics episodes

    Stablecoins and Global Imbalances, Gilles Moëc explains why we can think of stablecoins as a radical macroeconomic experiment that has arrived at exactly the moment the US external position is showing signs of stress.
    Can blockchain decentralise money, contracts, and finance? Bruno Biais on blockchain’s potential, its flaws, and its future.
    Do stablecoins threaten financial stability? Richard Portes thinks so.
  • VoxTalks Economics

    S9 Ep29: Guns and Butter

    15-05-2026 | 21 Min.
    Europe's NATO members have pledged 3.5% of GDP to rearmament. The political argument is already about which social programmes will be sacrificed to pay for this, when the government chooses guns instead of butter. What does history tell us about what politicians will do?
    Christoph Trebesch and Johannes Marzian spent four years assembling the Global Budget Database: 150 years of primary government budget documents from 20 countries, with 116 identified military spending booms in peace and war. They find that governments almost never cut social spending when they rearm; they expand both military and welfare budgets simultaneously. The bill arrives later, as higher taxes. Top income rates typically rise by 10 to 15 percentage points in the decade following a military boom, funded mainly through broad-based income and value-added taxes. With rearmament underway, will history repeat itself?
    The research behind this episode:
    Marzian, Johannes, and Christoph Trebesch. 2026. "Guns and Butter: The Fiscal Consequences of Rearmament and War." CEPR Discussion Paper 21193. [Gated]
    To cite this episode:
    Phillips, Tim, and Christoph Trebesch. 2026. "Guns and Butter." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). 

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    About the guest

    Christoph Trebesch is Director of the Research Center on International Finance at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy and Professor of Macroeconomics at Kiel University. His research spans sovereign debt, financial crises, China's role in global finance, the economics of populism, and the long-run fiscal history of military spending. He is a Research Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). In 2024 he received the Hermann Heinrich Gossen Award, Germany's leading economics prize for economists under 45.
    Research cited in this episode

    The Global Budget Database is the primary dataset introduced in this paper. Marzian and Trebesch constructed it from primary archival sources, including national parliamentary budget documents, for 20 countries from 1870 to 2022. Unlike existing datasets that rely on planned rather than realised expenditures, it records what governments actually spent, broken down by ministry and purpose. The Switzerland case illustrates the stakes: standard sources record Swiss military spending at around 2% of GDP during the World Wars. The archival record shows actual spending reached 10% once off-budget items are included; five times the apparent figure.
    The Correlates of War (COW) Military Expenditures Dataset is one of the most widely used secondary-source datasets for historical military spending, maintained by the Correlates of War Project. Trebesch uses the Swiss case to illustrate the limitations of secondary-source data: the COW series misses off-budget military items that primary archival documents capture, producing a significantly distorted picture of wartime mobilisation in a number of countries.
    Credit booms methodology provided the template for identifying military spending booms. Trebesch and Marzian define a boom as an increase of at least 6.5 percentage points of military spending as a share of GDP over two consecutive years, ending when spending growth falls to zero. This approach, adapted from the literature on financial credit expansions and their economic consequences, allows systematic cross-country and cross-period identification without relying on retrospective classification alone. Each algorithmically flagged episode was then verified against historical sources.
    Local projections are the main statistical technique used to trace the long-run fiscal path following military booms. The method estimates how a variable (here, tax revenues and top income rates) evolves over time following an identified shock. It is well suited to the protracted dynamics Trebesch and Marzian observe: tax rates rising over a decade or more after a military buildup and, critically, not returning to pre-boom levels once the spending episode ends.
    Exogenous military shocks are the basis of the paper's causal identification strategy. To separate the fiscal effects of military spending from broader economic conditions, the authors distinguish episodes triggered by external geopolitical events from those driven by domestic factors. France's rearmament in the mid-1930s, forced by Nazi Germany's military expansion regardless of French domestic politics, is used as an example of an exogenous peacetime boom. Germany's own rearmament in the same period would not qualify as exogenous, since Germany initiated the shock. The same logic applies to wars: a country attacked faces an exogenous event; the attacker does not.
    More VoxTalks Economics episodes

    In Can Europe Defend Itself?, featuring Moritz Schularick, Christoph’s colleague from the Kiel Institute, we examine whether Europe has the industrial and strategic capacity to convert its rearmament commitment into credible deterrence, and what European rearmament could mean in practice. 
    Related reading on VoxEU

    Defence spending: no free lunch, a VoxEU column arguing that increased military expenditure adds modestly to near-term economic activity while adding to fiscal pressure; lasting economic benefits from rearmament are far from guaranteed.
    Macroeconomic impacts of defence spending, a VoxEU column modelling the EU-wide effects of raising NATO members' defence spending to 5% of GDP by 2035; projected GDP gains are modest and come at the cost of higher debt-to-GDP ratios.
    Converging military spending and its fiscal consequences, a VoxEU column examining long-run trends in military expenditure across countries and the fiscal footprint they leave behind.
    The economic effects of military support for Ukraine: evidence from fiscal multipliers in donor countries, a VoxEU column finding that spending multipliers for military expenditure can exceed those for other categories of public spending.
  • VoxTalks Economics

    S9 Ep28: Immigration and integration in Europe

    08-05-2026 | 25 Min.
    More than one in eight people living in the EU today was born in another country. In fourteen of the bloc's largest economies, it is closer to one in six. For ten years, the same team of researchers has asked what happens to those people next: do they find work, close the gap with their native-born neighbours, and build a settled life? The tenth Migration Observatory report is about to be published, and the decade-long picture it paints is not what the political debate might lead you to expect.
    Tommaso Frattini of the University of Milan, one of the report's editors, joins Tim Phillips to examine what a decade of consistent, comparable data actually reveals about immigrant integration across Europe. Who are Europe's immigrants, and has that changed? Is the employment gap between migrants and natives closing, stable, or widening? And does it matter whether a migrant arrives from inside the EU or out? The politics of migration is often poisonous, but the data tells a different story.
    The research behind this episode

    Frattini, Tommaso, and Anissa Bouchlaghem.  2026. "Immigrant Integration in Europe." Migration Observatory Annual Report, 10th edition. Collegio Carlo Alberto / LdA / CEPR Press. Free download from CEPR Press, forthcoming on 18 May.
    To cite this episode

    Phillips, Tim, and Tommaso Frattini. 2026. "Immigration and integration in Europe." VoxTalks Economics (podcast).

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    About the guest

    Tommaso Frattini is Professor of Economics at the University of Milan and a member of the CEPR Research Policy Network on the Political Economy of Migration. His research spans labour markets, immigration economics, and the long-run integration of migrant populations in Europe. He is one of the founding editors of the Migration Observatory Annual Report series, now in its tenth year, and a co-author of the Collegio Carlo Alberto / LdA reports that underpin this episode.
    Research cited in this episode

    European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS). Eurostat, collected annually by national statistical offices and harmonised across EU member states. The EU-LFS is the primary source for the Migration Observatory's comparative analysis of employment outcomes across countries and over time. The figures cited in this episode are drawn from the 2024 edition, the most recent available at the time of publication.
    The employment gap. A measure of labour market integration defined as the percentage-point difference in the probability of being employed between migrants and native-born residents of the same country. A gap of zero would indicate full employment parity. The Migration Observatory computes the gap both raw and adjusted for observable characteristics such as age, education, and gender; the adjusted figure isolates the portion of the gap that cannot be explained by differences in workforce composition between the two groups.
    Migration Observatory Annual Report series. Published annually since 2016 by the Collegio Carlo Alberto and the LdA (Laboratorio di Economia Applicata), in partnership with CEPR. Each edition uses the EU-LFS to benchmark migrant labour market outcomes against those of natives across EU member states. The tenth edition, published in 2026, is the first to offer a consistent decade-long comparison across the full series.
    The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. Agreed by EU member states in 2024, the Pact is the EU's most significant attempt to harmonise migration and asylum policy across member states. Frattini describes it as a step forward on harmonisation; he also notes that European policy continues to prioritise border control over integration, a balance he argues the data does not support.
    More VoxTalks Economics episodes

    Immigration and Public Goods (June 2023). Do immigrants put pressure on local schools, hospitals, and public finances? Research from the United States tests the most common fears directly. The findings have only become more relevant since the episode aired.
  • VoxTalks Economics

    S9 Ep27: The right to choose to die

    01-05-2026 | 23 Min.
    Content note: this episode discusses assisted dying, end-of-life choices, and suicide. Some listeners may find the content distressing.

    In April 2024, Daniel Kahneman — one of the most influential psychologists of the twentieth century — emailed his close friends to say goodbye. He was 90 years old, his kidneys were failing, his mental lapses were increasing, and he had decided it was time to go. He flew to Switzerland to end his life at an assisted dying clinic there, because New York, where he lived, did not permit it. Thirteen American states currently allow medical assistance in dying; most require a terminal diagnosis with death expected within six months. Canada, Belgium, and Switzerland allow it on broader terms. The UK introduced a bill to parliament, but it failed to pass. The debate on whether we have the right to end our own lives has not been resolved. 
    This week Tim Phillips talks to Al Roth of Stanford University about how economics can contribute to the debate on medical aid in dying (MAID). Roth, a Nobel Prize laureate, has written a new book that argues this, and similar debates, often miss the key insight: the binary choice of “allow” versus “ban” rarely reflects reality. For example, in the United States, he explains that physicians in jurisdictions where assisted dying is illegal are familiar with the practice of administering doses of drugs that will relieve pain, but also end life. 
    Roth's argument is not that assisted dying is always right. It is that a moral position that ignores the costs of a ban is not more ethical — it is less honest. Economists, he says, bring one specific thing to this debate: the insistence that trade-offs be made explicit.
    The book discussed in this episode:
    Roth, Alvin E. 2026. Moral Economics: What Controversial Transactions Reveal about How Markets Work. Basic Books. Published 21 May 2026.
    To cite this episode:
    Phillips, Tim, and Alvin Roth. 2026. “The right to choose to die." VoxTalks Economics (podcast).

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    About the guest

    Alvin Roth is the Craig and Susan McCaw Professor of Economics at Stanford University. He was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2012, shared with Lloyd Shapley, for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design. He is one of the architects of modern matching market design, having redesigned the systems used in the United States to match medical residents to hospitals and students to schools. A previous book, Who Gets What — and Why, was published in 2014. 
    Research cited in this episode

    Repugnant transactions is Alvin Roth's term for a class of transactions that are controversial not because no one wants to engage in them — that would be disgust — but because some people do want to engage in them and others believe they should not be allowed to, typically on moral or religious grounds. The key feature is that the objectors suffer no direct externality from the transaction; their objection is to the thing happening at all, regardless of whether it affects them. Roth's examples across the book include medical aid in dying, kidney sales, paid blood plasma donation, surrogacy, and access to certain drugs. The policy implication is that repugnant transactions, unlike ordinary market failures, cannot be resolved by standard economic tools; they require explicit engagement with the moral contest and careful mechanism design to decide what is permitted, to whom, under what conditions.
    Oregon's Death with Dignity Act (1997) was the first US state law permitting physician-assisted dying. It requires a terminal diagnosis with death expected within six months, confirmation from two physicians, a waiting period, and self-administration of the medication by the patient. According to the 2024 report of the Oregon Health Authority, assisted dying accounts for roughly 0.9% of all deaths in Oregon; many patients who obtain a prescription never use it. Oregon's 27 years of data make it the most-studied model for the policy, and its take-up rates and population demographics have informed both advocates and critics in other jurisdictions.
    Ezekiel Emanuel and vulnerable populations: A 2016 paper by physician and bioethicist Ezekiel Emanuel and co-authors examined the demographics of patients who access assisted dying in jurisdictions where it is legal and found no evidence that vulnerable populations — defined by disability, age, mental illness, or socioeconomic status — accessed it at higher rates than the broader population of dying patients. Roth cites this as evidence against the argument that legalisation creates pressure on the vulnerable to choose death, while noting that this population-level finding does not rule out individual cases of pressure.
    The Hippocratic Oath is the earliest recorded professional commitment by physicians not to participate in assisted dying. Roth notes that Hippocrates formulated the oath in the fifth century CE, and that the very inclusion of a prohibition on helping patients die implies the practice was already occurring — physicians were being asked to do it. The religious objection — that decisions about life and death belong to God — and the medical objection — that a physician's role is to save life, not end it — have both been consistent features of opposition to assisted dying across more than two millennia.
    The Canadian Supreme Court decision (Carter v. Canada, 2015) struck down Canada's criminal prohibition on physician-assisted dying on the grounds that it infringed Canadians' constitutional rights to life and to security of the person. The court's reasoning included the counterintuitive argument that denying access to assisted dying could cause people to end their lives earlier and less safely — while still capable of doing so — out of fear of being unable to later. The Canadian framework that followed is more permissive than US state laws: it does not require a terminal diagnosis but instead an irremediable condition causing intolerable suffering. Canada has since debated, and repeatedly delayed, extending the framework to mental illness as a sole underlying condition.
    Mechanism design is the field of economics concerned with designing rules, institutions, and processes to achieve desired outcomes, particularly in settings where participants have private information or conflicting interests. Roth is one of its leading practitioners. In the context of assisted dying, mechanism design asks: who can apply, through what process, verified by whom, with what waiting periods, and with what safeguards against coercion or mistaken diagnosis? The differences between Oregon's model (terminal diagnosis, self-administration, annual reporting), Canada's model (irremediable suffering, physician or nurse practitioner administration permitted), and Switzerland's model (available to non-residents) are, in Roth's framing, different mechanism designs with measurably different outcomes.
    More VoxTalks Economics episodes

    In February, Tim spoke to Martin Ellison and Julian Ashwin about what decisions seniors will take about their later years and whether policy can accommodate both their abilities and their needs. Listen to The Economic Consequences of Living Longer.
  • VoxTalks Economics

    S9 Ep26: The public origins of American innovation

    24-04-2026 | 31 Min.
    The standard story of American innovation features Silicon Valley, venture capital, and the heroic startup founder.When you trace the history of the internet, GPS, mass-produced penicillin, or the COVID vaccine, the starting point is not a term sheet but a government grant. How much does this matter,  and can we measure it?
    Tim Phillips speaks to Paolo Surico of London Business School and CEPR who, working with Andrea Gazzani, Joseba Martinez, and Filippo Natoli, has built the first systematic empirical account of how government-funded innovation has shaped US productivity since the Second World War. The headline result: government-funded patents account for roughly 2% of all patents filed in the post-war period, but explain around 20% of medium-term fluctuations in total factor productivity and GDP growth. The return on every dollar of public R&D is more than double the return on every dollar of private R&D. The key mechanism is not that government crowds out private investment; it crowds it in. For every dollar of public research, roughly another dollar of private investment follows, as talent from universities and research institutes moves into startups that commercialise what the public sector seeded. The logic is high-risk, high-reward: the government takes on the uncertainty and fixed costs that the private sector will not bear, accepting a large number of failures in order to find the breakthroughs that private capital would never have funded. 
    The model is now under pressure: 2025 brought the largest cuts to US federal science funding in the post-war period. AI adds a further complication: for the first time, a general-purpose technology is being driven primarily by private capital, and that capital is now pulling the best scientific talent out of research institutes and universities and into industry. If that shift becomes permanent, the direction of innovation will be shaped by profitability rather than by broad productivity and living standards. 
    The paper discussed in this episode:
    Gazzani, Andrea, Joseba Martinez, Filippo Natoli, and Paolo Surico. 2026. "The Public Origins of American Innovation." CEPR Discussion Paper DP20788. Centre for Economic Policy Research. [gated]
    To cite this episode:

    Phillips, Tim, and Paolo Surico. 2026. "The Public Origins of American Innovation." VoxTalks Economics (podcast/video). 
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    About the guest

    Paolo Surico is Professor of Economics at London Business School and a Research Fellow of CEPR. [verify URL before publishing] His research focuses on macroeconomics, monetary policy, and the economics of innovation and growth. He has advised central banks and governments on macroeconomic policy and is one of the leading empirical macroeconomists working on the aggregate effects of technology and public investment.
    Research cited in this episode

    Science: The Endless Frontier (Vannevar Bush, 1945) is the report commissioned by President Roosevelt as the Second World War was ending. Bush, Roosevelt's chief scientific advisor, was asked to distil what the wartime mobilisation of research had taught, and how it could be translated into a peacetime innovation ecosystem. The report identified three pillars: government, to set the direction of innovation by funding areas of strategic importance; research institutes and universities, to push the frontier of knowledge without the constraint of commercial goals; and the private sector, to transform new knowledge into new products. The framework became the organisational blueprint for post-war American science and, Surico argues, is the institutional foundation of American technological and economic leadership. The report is in the public domain and available online.
    The NIH and NSF are the two federal agencies whose funded innovations show the strongest subsequent links to productivity growth in the paper's results. The NIH (National Institutes of Health) funds health and biomedical research; the NSF (National Science Foundation) funds basic research across science and engineering. Both are predominantly funders of university and research-institute work — which is, Surico argues, precisely why their output generates larger productivity gains than defence-funded innovation. The result is not that health research is inherently more productive than defence research; it is that both the NIH and NSF fund more basic, frontier-pushing work, and that basic research generates the largest spillovers regardless of the department that pays for it.
    Crowding in versus crowding out is the central empirical question in the public R&D literature. Crowding out would mean that government spending on research displaces private spending that would have happened anyway, leaving total innovation roughly unchanged. Crowding in means the opposite: public research creates opportunities and trains talent that then attracts additional private investment. The paper finds consistent evidence of crowding in, particularly when government funds flow to universities and research institutes. For every dollar of public R&D, roughly another dollar of private investment follows, typically as researchers from publicly funded institutions move into startups to commercialise what they developed. This is why the aggregate return on public R&D is more than double the return on private R&D, even though government-funded patents are only two percent of the total.
    The Solyndra and Tesla parallel is used to illustrate why anecdote-based arguments about public R&D are unreliable. Solyndra — a solar energy company that received a US government loan guarantee and then failed spectacularly — is a frequently cited example of government waste in innovation funding. Tesla received a loan guarantee in the same round of funding and became one of the most valuable companies in history. Surico's broader point is that the government's logic for innovation investment is high-risk, high-reward: it should expect and accept a large number of failures, because the gains from the successes — when they are large enough — more than compensate for the losses. Evaluating public R&D by its failures misses this; evaluating it by its headline successes also misses it. Systematic analysis across the whole portfolio is required.
    Philippe Aghion's Nobel Prize lecture is cited by Surico on the relationship between innovation, competition, and market structure. Aghion, who shared the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2018, developed Schumpeterian growth theory — the idea that economic growth is driven by creative destruction, with new entrants displacing incumbents through innovation. The key implication Surico draws on is that incumbents have a structural incentive not to innovate disruptively, because doing so would destroy the market position they already hold. Startups, which have no existing position to protect, are the natural vehicle for disruptive innovation. This is why the paper finds that government-funded startups generate larger macroeconomic impacts than government-funded incumbents: startups have both the mandate from public funding and the commercial incentive to take market share.
    DARPA (the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) is the US defence department's high-risk research arm, responsible for funding some of the most consequential technologies of the post-war era, including early internet infrastructure. Surico mentions a less celebrated DARPA project — an attempt to embed microchips into bags for tracking, before drone technology made the approach obsolete — as an example of a genuine failure. It illustrates the high failure rate that comes with high-risk public R&D, and the importance of evaluating the portfolio rather than individual projects.
    The Draghi report on European competitiveness is cited by Surico as a potential catalyst for a different model of European public investment in innovation. Europe's problem, in his analysis, is not the level of public spending but its composition: too much goes to procurement and too little to basic research and later-stage startup support. Europe has the talent, the research institutes, and the early-stage startups. What it consistently lacks is the capacity to fund the scaling-up phase, which causes European innovations and innovators to be commercialised in the United States. A reallocation of spending toward public R&D that acts as a venture catalyst for later-stage startups — analogous to what Vannevar Bush's framework did for the US after 1945 — is what Surico believes the Draghi report could enable, if acted on.
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