Thoughts on the Market

How much runway does the world’s energy market still have? Our Head of Commodity Research Martijn Rats joins our Global Head of Fixed Income Research Andrew Sheets to explain what’s causing pressure beyond renewed tensions in the Middle East.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.

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Andrew Sheets: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Global Head of Fixed Income Research at Morgan Stanley.
Martijn Rats: And I'm Martijn Rats, Head of Commodity Research at Morgan Stanley.
Andrew Sheets: Today – talking about the recent volatility and the direction ahead for oil.
It's Wednesday, July 29th at 2pm in London.
Martijn, it's great to talk to you again. We haven't talked for a little while on this program. But oil is once again back in the headlines and it's moving around.
So maybe to just jump right into things, as you look at the lay of the land in global energy markets at the moment, what's been happening? What are you telling clients?
Martijn Rats: Okay. Well, we've had a large amount of volatility, over the last couple of weeks. If you roll the clock back, sort of, to the beginning of June. In the beginning of June, it started to become clear that already some more oil was leaking out of the Strait of Hormuz than perhaps, many of us anticipated at the time.
But that data has been confirmed since then. And then, of course, in the middle of June, we got the memorandum of understanding. And after that, roughly 100-150 million barrels a day or so that was behind the Strait of Hormuz got cleared. And that…
Andrew Sheets: These were tankers that were stuck there during the conflict, all came out.
Martijn Rats: Absolutely. Laden tankers that were there; had just basically turned into floating storage for a good couple of months. They all cleared out, and that actually created a bit of a glut, in the sense that all of a sudden, the refiners of this world had a lot of crude to absorb. And we saw many indications of physical looseness in the market, physical differentials, calendar spreads.
All sorts of indicators pointed that physically there was a lot of oil, temporarily to be absorbed. And the spot price of Brent fell to $70. And that looked to be the new direction of travel. In principle, the world is not short of oil if you take the geopolitics out of it.
So, for a while it, it looked bearish. But then a new set of disruptions came, and the military conflict restarted, and we've had 13 days of overnight bombing. And with that also the flow through the Strait of Hormuz diminished again. And we are back in the last, sort of, week, 10 days to very, very low levels. The same levels we had in March.
The flow through the strait is not exactly zero. But it's sort of 2-3 million barrels a day, sort of, down 80 percent to 90 percent of what it was before the conflict. And with that, prices have rallied. But on top of that, last week it looked like the military activity could really scale up. And for a couple of days, the markets priced that in.
But then we have other choke points to take into account now. Not only Hormuz, but the Bab el-Mandeb, the CPC terminal, the issues in global refining. Altogether, it's been a tremendously volatile period. So, we're on the whole leaning towards the constructive side because there are so many disruptions in the system. But it's a very hard one to call at the moment.
Andrew Sheets: So Martijn, let's talk about those other disruptions besides just the Strait of Hormuz. Because yeah, it's not just the Strait of Hormuz anymore. We have issues in the Red Sea. You have ongoing issues with Russian energy infrastructure that's being attacked by Ukraine. Just what are these other factors that are out there? And how much do they matter relative to, you know, how many ships are passing through the Strait of Hormuz?
Martijn Rats: Yeah. They matter a lot, and you can see that expressed in the price of refined product more than the price of crude. If you look at the main global benchmark for the price of diesel, which is arguably the ICE gas-oil contract, which are diesel barges delivered in Rotterdam or in the wider ARA area, it's trading at about $1,200 a ton, which is sort of $150-$160 per barrel.
That's where you see the tightness. And so out of the total end user price, the refiners are capturing more at the moment than the crude suppliers. But what end users pay is not $85 per barrel for Brent crude oil, it's $1,200 a ton for diesel. And that is a very high price. Now, that is a result effectively of four major issues that the oil market has to deal with.
One of them is Hormuz, as just discussed. But then we come to these other three. And these other three are the Bab el-Mandeb, which is the strait on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula that provides entry and exit to the Red Sea. That strait has gained in importance because Saudi Arabia has been redirecting about 4 million barrels a day of crude oil supply that was previously exported via Hormuz. Now through the East-West Pipeline to a terminal near a city called Yanbu, from where it is loaded and mostly sails down south through the Bab el-Mandab to refineries in Asia.
The Bab el-Mandab is a strait that is effectively controlled by the Houthis, which is an Iran-aligned group that controls much of Yemen. And already in [20]24, earlier in [20]25, they've been very effective, controlling tanker traffic through that strait. And in the last sort of week or so, they have said that they will no longer allow Saudi tankers to sail out. And also, that group has executed drone attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure near the Jazan refinery, near the Yanbu terminal, and overnight also the Abqaiq facility, which is a large oil processing plant.
So, this whole Red Sea situation puts at risk something like an incremental 3.5 million barrels a day of crude.
Then we've had to deal with issues at the CPC terminal, which is again, also a very large oil export terminal. About 1.5-2 million barrels a day of crude is exported from CPC, which is a terminal near the Russian city of Novorossiysk.
Ukraine has been executing drone attacks on tankers that have been trying to load from the CPC terminal. Much of last week, the CPC terminal was out. Over the last 24 hours, a few tankers have loaded again, but it's very unreliable. It's on again, off again. It's a very disrupted flow. In and of itself, a single terminal loading 1.5-2 million barrels a day is very, very large. So, we care.
And then the third issue that the oil market has been dealing with, and this also comes back to this issue about these refined product prices, is very severe tightness in the global refining system. That is an issue of some refineries can't export because they're behind the Strait of Hormuz again.
So, you can say, "Well, isn't that; that's sort of the same problem?" But nevertheless, it expresses it somewhere else. It's partly a problem of, sort of, the Chinese refinery system running very low. But it's recently mostly been driven by Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian refineries. And by now, something like 60 percent of the Russian refining system is out.
And with that, exports of refined products have declined very significantly. There's a gasoline export ban. There's a diesel export ban from Russia. Russia used to be a very large diesel exporter. That is now down to practically zero. And with that, refined product markets have rallied severely on top of the price of crude.
Andrew Sheets: And I think that's interesting [be]cause when we think about the economic impact of oil, while, you know, the price of oil per barrel is often the most kind of visible marker that we have – it's often the refined product that we actually use. You know, a truck is running on diesel. It's not running on crude oil.
And, you know, that cost of diesel, of jet fuel, of gasoline, you know, that is the thing that can often really affect business margins. And the ability to operate and move product around. So, I mean, just give a sense like how much have those diesel prices gone up? And how much further could they rise if you're operating, you know, a trucking company in Europe?
Martijn Rats: Yeah. Look, when supply is inherently scarce, we often ask the question – what is the demand destruction price, right? If you can't supply the stuff quick enough, the physical oil market, be it crude or refined product, must balance.
There are a finite number of molecules in the system, and we can store them for a bit. We can take them out of storage. But when you take storage into account, molecules can't disappear out of nowhere. And they can't create it out of nowhere either. So, the system must balance. And if you can't supply it quick enough, the only way to balance sometimes is through demand destruction.
And then we ask the question, what is the price that effectively causes that to happen? And if you look historically, that is often expressed in crude, something like $140-$150 a barrel. We've seen that before. But those were occasions where refining was not an issue. And then crude needs to do the heavy lifting to drive prices higher.
What we're having at the moment is that refined products need to do it. And so, from experience earlier in the year, back in 2022, some other occasions, the price that destroys diesel demand is probably in the order of $1,400 a ton. In the diesel market, we use tons rather than barrels for historical reasons. Just to make it easy.
But it's about $1,400 a ton, which is about sort of, you know, like $180-$190 per barrel. That really stops diesel demand in its track. At the moment, we're $1,230-$1,240, that sort of level. And so, we are getting close. There is probably a little bit more to go, like another 5 percent, 10 percent, that sort of thing, before you really hit some exceptionally high levels.
But the diesel price, I would argue, is doing exactly that. It's searching for this demand destruction price. It's just if you then take that sort of $160 diesel that we have at the moment, how much do the refiners get versus how much do the crude producers get?
At the moment, the refiners are getting $65- $70 out of that, leaving comparatively little for the crude supplier. But the refined product price is the channel by which the economy is impacted and ultimately also by which demand is eroded.
Andrew Sheets: When we're talking about demand destruction, we're talking about at what price does a trucking company not operate, does not drive as much, you know, does not, you know... We're talking about less activity. And inherently that is, I think a risk to growth. But especially risk to growth in Europe where the starting point for growth is already pretty weak.
Martijn Rats: Yes. So, we are watching as much, how the Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian refiners are playing out as we are watching, sort of, the Strait of Hormuz.
Andrew Sheets: Martijn, the last thing I wanted to talk to you about is, you know, we've been talking about the Iran conflict since late February. And, you know, we're sitting here in late July. And it's clear that, you know, there was a small normalization in flows as you talked about. But we're back to a place where those flows are nowhere near normal.
And I think the question on everybody's mind is how much longer can this go on before there's a much larger shock to energy prices?
Now, again, you've mentioned we're already seeing some of that shock to diesel, but, you know, a much bigger disruption. What's your current thinking on how much runway the energy system still has?
Martijn Rats: Yeah. It's an excellent question, and it's turned out to be fiendishly hard to answer. My gut feel based on how the data is behaving, based on what we know from history: If this lasts another, sort of, month or two, three, then it's hard to argue that by then the buffers in the system will not have been completely exhausted.
The reason why I think oil analysts have lost a degree of confidence in forecasting this accurately is that there's a lot of unexplained oil that does require some explanation. If you look at the cumulative amount of supply loss from the Middle East since the start of this conflict, easily over 1.5 billion barrels. 1.5 billion barrels in 150 days is an enormous amount.
And yet, the inventory draws that we can find in observable data, they are at best a third of that, maybe 0.5 billion barrels. And so, there's another billion barrels where you say, "Yeah, we had that last year, but we don't have this this year.”
How did we solve that billion-barrel problem? And you can say, "Well, we were a bit oversupplied going into it," and a few other things. But you, sort of, have to conclude, and I think this is also, you know, talking to clients and investors, other market participants. I think this is sort of collectively we're discovering this is that this system of, like, unobservable inventories has to be way bigger.
That is either inventories like in the supply chain, inventories at customers end, or in countries where we generally just have very little data anyway, like in China. And so, the system has been behaving as if already in [20]24 and [20]25 actually, we were putting a lot of oil into these, in storages that are hard to observe – because in that period we had the opposite problem.
We were forecasting large inventory builds, and we couldn't find them all. And now we're forecasting large draws, and we haven't been able to find them all. And so, the system has been behaving as this; the unobservable part of the inventories are way larger.
And… But at some point, they also run out. But because they're hard to observe, we don't know when. And I would guess if we're getting towards the end of the summer by August-September, and we're still in this situation? Yeah, then we're going into the winter. Like, you know, German households objectively have little storage of heating oil.
Andrew Sheets: Mm-hmm.
Martijn Rats: And they need to be rebuilt. And there are a few examples where we do know what customers are doing with their inventories, and they point to a picture where, yeah, by the end of the summer, like, we're running on fumes. And so, look, this – we've been able to patch this up. But it can't go on forever.
Andrew Sheets: Well, Martijn, always a pleasure to, to catch up with you and talk energy markets.
Martijn Rats: Nice to talk to you.
Andrew Sheets: And thank you for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please take a moment to rate and review us.
And please share with a friend or colleague today.

Our Global Head of Macro Strategy Matthew Hornbach and Chief U.S. Economist Michael Gapen unpack what is likely to influence this week’s interest rate decision by the Fed.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.

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Matthew Hornbach: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Matthew Hornbach, Global Head of Macro Strategy.
Michael Gapen: And I'm Michael Gapen, Morgan Stanley's Chief U.S. Economist.
Matthew Hornbach: Today, will the Fed hold or hike? It's the question in the market right now.
It's Tuesday, July 28th at 9:30am in New York.
Will the Fed display patience, or has it run out of patience? That's the question hanging over the July FOMC meeting currently underway.
We believe the former. We expect the Fed to keep the target range for the federal funds rate unchanged at 3.5 to 3.75 percent. The statement will probably also remain unchanged, reiterating the ample reserve policy, economic activity expanding at a solid pace despite elevated uncertainty.
So, Mike, what's your assessment of the situation beyond that?
Michael Gapen: Our assessment of the July FOMC meeting is actually the case for hikes is not as persuasive now as it was in June. And I think when we say that and when we come to the decision the Fed will stay on hold this week, we're basing it mainly on the data that has come in since the June FOMC meeting. And two important pieces on that front are employment growth moderated.
So, in the June meeting, the three-month average payroll gain was running at about 188,000 per month. And I think it gave the sense that the labor market was really accelerating and there was downside risk to the unemployment rate. The subsequent employment data changed that view. Now it looks like there is much less of an acceleration in hiring and momentum has slowed. So, the labor market doesn't look quite as robust.
Second, there was a lot of information, we think, a lot of signal about disinflation. So yes, recent volatility in the Middle East did push oil prices temporarily higher. We'll see where that goes. But underneath the hood, there was significant softness in goods inflation and services inflation, particularly related to housing.
So, we do think that there was a lot of evidence that disinflation is here. So, with those two things in mind, we think there's less of a case to hike in July than there was in June. So, we think the right thing... Or what we think the Fed will do is to skip July, try and buy a little more time, get a little more information. If disinflation is indeed here, the Fed stays on hold. If not, and inflation stays firm, well, they can move to rate hikes later this year.
But we think the case to hike in July is less compelling than it was in June.
Matthew Hornbach: Well, they certainly will get a lot more information between the July meeting and the September meeting. If memory serves, at least two more rounds of all of the major economic data points…
Michael Gapen: That’s right.
Matthew Hornbach: Payroll, CPI, and so on.
Michael Gapen: That's right. The gap between the July FOMC meeting and the September FOMC meeting is the longest on the Fed's calendar. Of course, in part, that makes room for Jackson Hole in August, which if the Fed were moving to a tightening cycle, could be a venue to lay out the case for that. But you're right, they will see multiple employment and inflation reports before they meet again in September.
Matthew Hornbach: If they really wanted to get ahead of that data and move at this meeting, what is the case for hiking rates in July? How would you think about that perspective?
Michael Gapen: I think you could make a couple of cases to hike now. One is recent volatility and conflict in the Middle East has pushed oil prices higher. Maybe it convinces you – you're in a prolonged oil risk premium scenario, and inflation will not dissipate.
Second, I think you could argue, well, it's a balance of risks argument. And we think risks have just shifted in the direction of inflation, where last year they were in the direction of a weaker labor market. We eased last year. Let's just reverse those risk management rate cuts this year. So, it's not about inflation in hand, it's about your view of risks around inflation.
Another, I think, and to me, this is the most important one, is maybe Warsh wants a regime change in the reaction function. In other words, he emphasizes price stability and achieving the 2 percent target. Well, at some point, words are words and actions are actions. And maybe what he desires is a more hawkish reaction function and kind of a higher interest rate all else equal to guide inflation down to 2 percent more quickly.
So, I think, Matt, if we're wrong this week, I think the main reason we're wrong is I'm thinking under an older reaction function, and Warsh is bringing a new one. And right now, we don't exactly know what his reaction function is. And he could reveal it this week as being in a direction where he really wants to concentrate on the inflation side of the mandate to the exclusion of nearly everything else.
Matthew Hornbach: Well, I don't think that's lost on markets at all. And in fact, I think that the rise in yields we've seen in the bond market concentrated in the real yield component of the 10-year Treasury bond tells you a lot about how investors are thinking the Fed will react to higher energy prices. As energy prices have gone up, so have bond yields.
The relationship between those two asset prices are very strong. And usually what that suggests is if the real yield is going up more than the break-even inflation rate is going up as energy prices rise, it's telling you that investors think the Fed will not look through the rise in energy prices.
If you have the opposite happen, where your break-even inflation rate is going higher, more so than the real interest rate is going higher, that would suggest investors think the Fed will look through the energy price increase. That just hasn't been the case, and so I think investors are very much attuned to what they think is the right reaction function for the Fed.
But I guess we'll see. Only time will tell. And I think in order to help us tell what the right reaction function is – we'll need some communication from the Fed. And maybe that's where I want to go next with you – is on communication.
It does seem like there have been fewer FOMC participants speaking to the public since Chairman Warsh began his tenure as chairman. Is that your impression? How do you think about communication? And since we are in the midst of this FOMC meeting, the press conference… What do you think about press conferences going forward?
Michael Gapen: I do think you're right. I haven't counted up the literal official FOMC communications. I do think there have likely been fewer speeches and/or interviews given recently. And whether or not that's a function of Kevin Warsh as the chairman or it's summer and things move a little slower, I don't know.
I will say, though, that when participants have spoken, I think we're getting the same, say, normal communication that they brought in the past. So far, I don't read participants as unwilling to provide their view about the outlook for the economy and for monetary policy.
On the press conference, boy, would that be a change. I've been of the view that you probably will not get what I'll call a major change to the SEPs or the press conferences in terms of their frequency until the task force on communications has run its course, where I think the deadline is ultimately later this year.
So, I don't think the schedule of press conferences will change until 2027, if it changes at all. But if we don't have them… The way that I would look at that, Matt, is to say, if the Fed's speaking less, there will be a vacuum out there to some degree. So, if the Fed's giving its view on the outlook and monetary policy less frequently, something else will fill that narrative, whether it's markets or the private sector or whatever it is.
Vacuums are going to get filled. The Fed's speaking less, somebody else will speak more. Maybe that drives volatility more. I guess it would depend on the situation, but I think pulling press conferences would be a major surprise. I don't think it's in market expectations, and my belief is it would probably lead to some increase in volatility over time.
How would you read it?
Matthew Hornbach: Absolutely. I think the void has already begun to be filled by investors and how they think about the Fed's reaction function, rightly or wrongly. Which is why I think we've seen real yields move in a very positively correlated way with energy prices. Investors are intuiting a certain reaction function to higher energy prices.
Whether or not that is the correct view, only time will tell.
If we do have a press conference at this upcoming meeting, which looks very likely, investors are going to pay attention to every nuance and every shift in the chairman's tone. How he chooses to address certain questions versus others—or whether he chooses to address them at all—will be important for market participants and how they invest in the bond and currency markets.
With that, Mike, thanks again for taking the time to talk. I look forward to catching up with you again in late August around the Jackson Hole symposium.
Michael Gapen: Great speaking with you, Matt. Thanks for having me on.
Matthew Hornbach: And thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen. And share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.

Our CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist Mike Wilson explains why he thinks the bull market has entered a new phase, with more focus on quality.
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Mike Wilson: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Mike Wilson, Morgan Stanley’s CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist.
Today on the podcast I’ll be discussing the transition from early- to mid-cycle and what that means for your portfolio.
It's Monday, July 27th at 11:30 am in New York.
So, let’s get after it.
Our broadening call for the market has been about moving beyond the narrow leadership of the mega-cap winners and into more economically sensitive areas. That made sense in the context of our rolling recovery thesis, a period when revenue growth returns to lean cost structures, and operating leverage emerges across many sectors of the economy.
But now, I think that early-cycle phase of the rolling recovery is ending, and the market is starting to rotate toward quality. That’s not bearish, but it is different and can affect portfolios at the stock level.
As the cycle matures, investors stop rewarding low quality beta and start focusing more on free cash flow, balance sheet strength, margins, and earnings stability. The market is not abandoning the recovery. It is becoming more selective about the best way to own it.
This setup reminds me of early-to-mid 2021. After the initial post-COVID rebound, leadership shifted away from lower-quality and more speculative areas and toward higher-quality companies. The S&P 500 kept rising, but the leadership changed.
I think we’re seeing something similar today. The S&P itself is already a quality-heavy benchmark, with high-quality cohorts representing roughly 42 percent of the index versus about 28 percent for low quality. That should help keep the index resilient, even as the market continues to digest this transition.
Could we still see near-term volatility? Absolutely.
If the war escalates further or the Fed surprises us with a rate hike this week, the market can continue to correct. I continue to think 7000 on the S&P 500 is important support if investors remain uneasy about the Fed transition or the geopolitical backdrop. However, the bigger message is that leadership is changing, not that the bull market is ending.
One of the most important drivers of this shift is AI adoption. Earlier in the cycle, margin expansion was about classic operating leverage: sales recovering faster than costs. From here, margin expansion will depend more on companies using AI effectively, running leaner, and turning productivity into revenue growth as well.
This is why quality matters. Companies with strong pricing power, strong balance sheets, or the ability to translate AI adoption into real growth are likely to be rewarded disproportionately.
Companies where AI is material to the investment thesis and pricing power is neutral to strong are seeing forward net margin expectations improve nearly 400 basis points above the median stock. Our transcript work also shows that roughly 25 percent of S&P 500 companies cited measurable benefits from AI adoption in the second quarter, up from 14 percent a year ago. That’s operating leverage with a new engine.
This also feeds into the AI leadership rotation. I still think semis are likely to underperform hyperscalers from here, even if both can be under pressure during the next leg of consolidation. Semis are a classic early-cycle group, and they’ve already seen a peak rate of change in earnings revisions. The hyperscalers, by contrast, have high quality core businesses, exposure to the agentic application layer, and an underappreciated ability to take costs out through AI-driven efficiencies.
In terms of the overall S&P 500, the two variables I’m watching most closely are interest rates and oil. The bond market is pricing a meaningful probability of a Fed hike, but my base case remains that the Fed stays on hold. A hike would be a hawkish surprise and a risky maneuver, but I think even that would delay rather than derail a positive finish to 2026 with earnings growth remaining strong.
Oil is the other wildcard. A sustained rise in oil is not priced into equities, and just another reason to move one’s portfolio up the quality ladder.
Bottom line, the broadening is not over, but it is changing shape and leadership. We’re moving from early-cycle beta toward mid-cycle quality as the market seeks not only growth, but companies that can convert that growth into durable free cash flow and margin expansion.
The recent elevation of quality factors has been evolving for the past month and now it’s time to fully embrace it.
Thanks for tuning in; I hope you found it informative and useful. Let us know what you think by leaving us a review. And if you find Thoughts on the Market worthwhile, tell a friend or colleague to try it out!

Looking at clues from the past, our Global Head of Fixed Income Research Andrew Sheets examines how the recurring themes – from deregulation to volatility – are shaping markets and why every cycle still takes its own path.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.

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Andrew Sheets: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Global Head of Fixed Income Research at Morgan Stanley.
Today, what can Odysseus teach us about investing?
It's Friday, July 24th at 2pm in London.
Like many of you, this week I saw The Odyssey. The enduring appeal of this story more than 2,700 years after it was composed is a reminder that some themes are universal. Pride, resourcefulness, determination, self-control, or the lack thereof, mattered to both an ancient Greek dinner party and resonate with anybody investing today.
But drawing lessons from the past is also tricky.
We do not have that much financial history, and markets contain too many variables for the same combination to align twice. Some judgment, art, and dare we say storytelling is always involved in deciding which historical periods best describe the present.
Those disclaimers aside, we've argued in our year ahead outlook that 1997 to 1998 and 2005 to 2006 are some of the most useful templates for the current backdrop.
That remains our view.
They suggest a cycle that has further to run, equities outperforming credit, and a preference to own volatility. Both of these periods were defined by a sharp rise in corporate activity. That is certainly what we're seeing today.
We forecast U.S. capital expenditure to rise 23 percent in 2026, and 26 percent in 2027. AI is the biggest driver of this spending but build-outs in energy infrastructure are also playing a role. And increased corporate CapEx is certainly a global story, especially in Asia.
Then there's M&A, which also rose significantly in these two past historical periods. As recently as early 2024, global M&A volumes were unusually depressed, some of the lowest levels in over 30 years, adjusted for economic size. But that's no longer the case. And more recently, M&A is currently running up 64 percent relative to a year ago.
Important current macroeconomic data also looks somewhat similar to these past two periods. The current levels of U.S. core PCE inflation, the unemployment rate, and the 10-year yield are pretty close to the averages seen in 1997, 1998, 2005, and 2006.
And the U.S. 2s10s yield curve, well, it broadly flattened then, and it has broadly been flattening today.
A third similarity, maybe less obvious but no less important, is deregulation. Both 1997 and 1998 and 2005 to 2006 saw significant financial deregulation. And we're seeing that again now. From the Basel Endgame to NAIC risk weights to Solvency II changes to savings reforms in Europe, Korea, and elsewhere, the current trend appears to be on a firmly deregulatory path.
Even more simply, 1997 and 1998 and 2005 to 2006 provide interesting narrative bookends to two ways that I often hear the current environment being described.
The late '90s? Well, that was defined by rising excitement around a transformational new technology – then the internet – and the prospect of a more productive future. Sound familiar?
And the mid-2000s? Well, that was defined by a very unequal economy and rising consumer stress – but growth that was still supported by a seemingly inexhaustible investment demand from a rising market force. Then that force was emerging markets. Today, it's AI. Again, somewhat familiar.
If these periods serve as a guide, the cycle probably has further to run, and corporate aggression should favor equities over credit.
But if we learn anything from the trials of Odysseus, the journey can throw up plenty of surprises along the way.
Thank you, as always, for your time. If you find Thoughts on the Market useful, let us know by leaving a review wherever you listen. And also tell a friend or colleague about us today.

Despite growing political resistance, investment in data centers isn't slowing. Ariana Salvatore explains why supply constraints may actually accelerate AI capital spending.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.

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Ariana Salvatore: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Ariana Salvatore, Head of Public Policy Research at Morgan Stanley.
Today, I'll be talking about why we still expect robust AI capital spending in spite of some rising political pushback.
It's Thursday, July 23rd at 10am in New York.
It should be no surprise to our listeners that data center pushback, a topic that we've been following for some time, has been growing louder. But in 2026, it's accelerated meaningfully. Data we track suggests that an estimated $156 billion of projects were canceled or delayed in 2025. This year alone, in just the first quarter, we've seen almost that same exact number.
The opposition is coming from several directions.
Communities are raising concerns about rising electricity bills, environmental pressures related to water use, and the local quality of life effects of large-scale construction. But it's also coming from lawmakers across the aisle. State legislatures with both Democratic and Republican lawmakers have been advancing this type of policy.
At the same time, we're forecasting a little less than a trillion dollars of AI CapEx this year alone, and we think it's an increasingly important component of the macroeconomic growth outlook.
So how do we square that circle?
First, and most importantly, we think this is primarily a supply-side risk rather than a demand-side one. We don't expect the backlash to materially reduce projections for compute demand. Instead, it could widen the gap between that demand and the industry's ability to bring new capacity online through things like permitting delays, grid interconnection constraints, and local opposition.
Despite that more difficult political and infrastructure environment, our internet team, led by Brian Nowak, remain constructive on AI capital spending. Our broader thematic estimate for total AI CapEX, including the neo cloud providers, stands at approximately $870 billion in 2026, and we actually see risks skewed even higher from here.
So why is spending still increasing as the environment for building data centers becomes more challenging? There are a few reasons.
First, the AI ecosystem remains compute constrained. The urgency to invest has not diminished. In fact, growing social opposition and political uncertainty ahead of the 2028 presidential election may actually be encouraging hyperscalers to begin projects earlier, which our credit strategists outline as a potential scenario here. A pull forward of demand before the political and execution risk grows even louder.
Second, the timelines associated with data center construction have become longer. From groundbreaking to operational launch, projects can now take as long as three years or even more. That gives companies a strong incentive to begin developing future capacity well in advance, even if the political pushback is strong.
And third, the underlying demand signal is not slowing. Global weekly token usage, which our analysts view as an important proxy for compute demand, has increased since early January. It's rising and continues to do so throughout the course of this year.
So, in short, the pushback is real, but it appears to be reshaping the build-out rather than stopping it.
That's why our base case is for a conditional build-out. We think projects are likely to face greater scrutiny, we think projects are likely to face greater scrutiny, longer delays, and more requirements related to environmental impact and community benefits.
But ultimately, we still think they cross the finish line. That could mean higher costs, it could mean longer development timelines, and greater geographic dispersion of projects away from the largest existing data center markets.
It could also accelerate the shift toward on-site and behind-the-meter power generation. Fuel cells, turbines, and energy storage are becoming increasingly important as operators look for ways to reduce their reliance on these lengthy grid interconnection processes, and that can benefit companies that are able to bring those solutions to the forefront.
Meanwhile, our U.S. equity strategy team maintains a relative preference for hyperscalers over semiconductors over the next several months. As you heard our CIO and Chief Equity Strategist Mike Wilson explain yesterday, that's because the team sees the hyperscalers as early in discounting the market's renewed focus on CapEx discipline.
Putting it all together, we see the growing pushback against data centers as representing a genuine risk to the pace, cost, and geography of the AI infrastructure build-out.
But again, this isn't just a demand story, it's a supply story. And somewhat paradoxically, the scarcity and the uncertainty created by these constraints could actually end up pulling capital spend forward rather than reducing it.
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